OPTIMAL DEFAULTS AND ACTIVE DECISIONS
OPTIMAL DEFAULTS AND ACTIVE DECISIONS
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DOI：
10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1639
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发表时间：
2009-11-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Metrick, Andrew
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Carroll, Gabriel D.;Choi, James J.;Metrick, Andrew
违约通常对消费者的决策有很大影响。我们找到了一个被忽视但实用的默认选择：要求个人为自己做出明确的选择。我们在 401(k) 储蓄的背景下研究此类“主动决策”。我们发现，迫使新员工就 401(k) 注册做出积极决定，相对于标准选择加入注册程序，初始注册比例提高了 28 个百分点，从而在雇用后三个月内产生节省分配，而在标准注册情况下需要 30 个月才能实现。我们还提出了 401(k) 注册模型，并得出最佳注册制度是自动注册（即默认注册）、标准注册（即默认不注册）或主动决策（即无默认和强制选择）的条件。当消费者有强烈的拖延倾向并且储蓄偏好高度异质时，积极的决策是最佳的。然而，财务无知者更倾向于默认注册而不是主动决策注册。
Defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make explicit choices for themselves. We study such "active decisions" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take thirty months to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment (i.e., default enrollment), standard enrollment (i.e., default nonenrollment), or active decisions (i.e., no default and compulsory choice). Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous. Financial illiteracy, however, favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment.