The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion
The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion
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情感的逻辑、意向性和现象学
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
M. Montague
中科院分区：
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作者：
M. Montague
我在这篇论文中关注的是情感的意向性。欲望和认知是意向性态度的传统范例，而对于情感的意向性问题，一个非常直接的方法是将其视为特殊的--与欲望和认知的意向性等同，但绝不能还原为欲望和认知的意向性。一个更常见的方法是将情感的意向性还原为我们熟悉的意向性态度（如欲望和认知）的意向性。在本文中，我主张自成一类的方法。
My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.