Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
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频谱拍卖设计手册
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Goeree
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Bichler;J. Goeree
在过去的二十年里，电信已经成为一个竞争激烈的行业，各公司都在竞相购买有价值的频谱。继美国联邦通信委员会于1994年成功举办个人通信服务（PCS）拍卖后，拍卖已取代传统的分配宝贵无线电频谱的方式，如比较听证会（有时称为“选美比赛”）或彩票。在频谱拍卖中，政府使用拍卖来出售在电磁频谱的特定频带上传输信号的许可证，并分配稀缺的频谱资源。频谱拍卖在全球范围内筹集了数千亿美元，并已成为公共和私营部门基于市场的方法的榜样。频谱许可证的分配持续数年，为运营商提供了强大的投资激励。它们决定着一个国家的移动的电话市场，并对最终消费者支付的价格和提供的服务产生重大影响。PCS拍卖是以同时多轮拍卖（SMRA）的形式组织的，这是一种简单但灵活的形式，可以并行出售多个对象，并具有许多优点。这种拍卖形式允许投标人单独竞争许可证，即使他们通常重视某些组合。不幸的是，SMRA使投标人面临风险，当他们积极投标所需的组合，但最终赢得了一个劣质的子集。投标人预见到这种可能性，可能会谨慎行事，对收入和效率产生不利影响。组合拍卖允许对许可证的组合进行投标，因此有望提高性能。频谱拍卖设计最近出现了一些创新，如单阶段和两阶段的组合时钟拍卖，分层包投标，或密封投标组合拍卖。组合拍卖允许投标人表达互补的频谱包的估值，然而，他们也导致了新的设计挑战，如分配问题的计算难度，或在某些拍卖格式的包出价的数量组合增长。编辑本书的动机来自与监管机构、咨询公司和电信公司的讨论，他们要求提供有关频谱拍卖设计最新趋势的文献。频谱拍卖正在世界各地定期进行，除了各个领域的学者和学生外，从业人员希望了解该领域的各种发展概况。更一般地说，在这本书的贡献处理资源分配问题，涉及硬计算分配问题，和战略市场参与者。这些问题是计算机科学、经济学和运筹学的基础。事实上，组合拍卖是唯一可能的今天，由于实质性的进步，
In the past two decades, telecommunications has turned into a highly competitive industry where companies are competing to buy valuable spectrum. Following the successful Personal Communications Services (PCS) Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum such as comparative hearings (sometimes referred to as ”beauty contests”), or lotteries. In a spectrum auction a government uses an auction to sell the licenses to transmit signals over specific bands of the electromagnetic spectrum and to assign scarce spectrum resources. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The allocation of spectrum licenses for several years provides strong investment incentives for the carriers. They shape the mobile telephony market in a country and have significant impact on the prices paid by and the service provided to end consumers. The PCS auction was organized as a simultaneous multi-round auction (SMRA), a simple but flexible format to sell multiple objects in parallel and has many advantages. This auction format allows bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. Unfortunately, SMRA exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Spectrum auction design has seen several innovations recently such as the single-stage and the two-stage combinatorial clock auction, hierarchical package bidding, or sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions allow bidders to express complementary valuations for packages of spectrum, however, they also lead to new design challenges such as the computational hardness of the allocation problem, or the combinatorial growth in the number of package bids in some auction formats. The motivation for this edited volume came from discussions with regulators, consultants, and telecoms who were asking for literature on recent trends in spectrum auction design. Spectrum auctions are being conducted regularly across the world, and apart from academics and students in the various fields, practitioners want to get an overview of various developments in this field. More generally speaking, the contributions in this book deal with resource allocation problems involving hard computational allocation problems, and strategic market participants. These questions are fundamental to computer science, economics, and operations research alike. Actually, combinatorial auctions are only possible nowadays due to the substantial advances in