Infectious disease and preventive behavior in an overlapping generations model
Infectious disease and preventive behavior in an overlapping generations model
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jedc.2004.09.007
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发表时间：
2005-10-01
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Futagami, K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Momota, A;Tabata, K;Futagami, K
本文结合了疾病的流行和代理人的预防行为（即，健康投资）转化为一个小型开放的世代交叠模型，研究了竞争性均衡分配的动态行为。使用该模型，它表明，代理人的“流行弹性行为”，这是从实证研究中得到支持，可以得到，这种代理人的行为导致疾病传播的周期性。我们还表明，虽然代理人的预防行为在竞争均衡可能是不够的，因为外部效应的存在，一次性的医疗援助从国外并不一定提高代理人的福利在帕累托意义上。(c)2004 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。
This paper incorporates prevalence of disease and agent's preventive behavior (i.e., health investment) into a small open overlapping generations model and investigates the dynamic behaviors of the competitive equilibrium allocation. Using the model, it is shown that agents' 'prevalence-elastic behaviors', which are supported from empirical studies, can be obtained, and that such agents' behaviors cause the cyclicity of the spread of disease. We also show that although the agents' preventive behavior in a competitive equilibrium may be insufficient because of the existence of external effects, a one-shot medical aid from foreign countries does not necessarily improve the agents' welfare in the Pareto sense. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.