Nash equilibrium in multiparty competitionwith “stochastic” voters
Nash equilibrium in multiparty competitionwith “stochastic” voters
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与“随机”选民的多党竞争中的纳什均衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
David C. Nixon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Schofield;I. Sened;David C. Nixon
选举投票的理论空间模型倾向于预测要么收敛到选举均值（当投票是概率性的），要么混乱（当投票是确定性的）。在这里，我们构建了一个经验模型，投票的以色列议会在1992年（基于一个大的选举样本和分析的政党声明）。这样估计的概率投票模型符合已知的选举结果。然后，我们使用相同的模型来模拟预期投票最大化的影响，由各方。与通常的结果相反，在这个目标函数下不存在唯一收敛的纳什均衡。然而，我们可以推断，这两个大党是“向下”的，在这个意义上，他们最大限度地提高了预期的投票（到模型的误差幅度）。我们认为，实证结果是兼容的混合模型的效用最大化，其中每个政党计算其政策声明的影响，无论是在选举的反应和选举后的联盟谈判。
Theoretical spatial models of electoral voting tend to predict either convergence to an electoral mean (when voting is probabilistic) or chaos (when voting is deterministic). Here, we construct an empirical model of voting for the Israeli Knesset in 1992 (based on a large electoral sample and on analysis of party declarations). The probabilistic voting model so estimated fits the known election results. We then use the same model to simulate the effect of expected vote maximization by the parties. Contrary to the usual results, there is no unique convergent Nash equilibrium under this objective function. We do infer, however, that the two large parties are “Downsian”, in the sense that they maximize expected vote (up to the margin of error of the model). We suggest that the empirical results are compatible with a hybrid model of utility maximization, where each party computes the effects of its policy declaration both in terms of electoral response and of post-election coalition negotations.