Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining
Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining
复制标题
立法谈判中的需求竞争与政策妥协
DOI：
10.2307/2586114
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
M. Morelli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Morelli
我提出了一个新的多数主义的谈判模型，其中一个以上的隐含的建议可以在同一时间在桌子上。不同制度之间的制度差异影响博弈顺序、均衡多数和政策结果。然而，获胜联盟内部收益的事后分布不受根本制度差异的影响，而且总是与相对事前谈判能力的分布成正比。讨价还价的过程被建模为一个顺序的需求博弈，在这个博弈中，玩家被要求提出一个政策，并指定他们想要的份额的私人利益相关的是在办公室。博弈的顺序是内生的，在均衡多数中收益的分配通常不取决于谁是提议者。国家元首的作用和优势，中央政党也进行了研究。
I propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time. Institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play, the equilibrium majorities, and the policy outcome. The ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is, however, invariant to fundamental institutional differences, and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. The bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game, in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office. The order of play is endogenous, and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker. The role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied.