Asymmetric Accountability: An Experimental Investigation of Biases in Evaluations of Governments’ Election Pledges
Asymmetric Accountability: An Experimental Investigation of Biases in Evaluations of Governments’ Election Pledges
复制标题
不对称问责：对政府选举承诺评估偏差的实验调查
DOI：
10.1177/0010414019830740
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Niels Markwat
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Elin Naurin;S. Soroka;Niels Markwat
政府经常履行继续掌权的选举承诺；然而，目前尚不清楚兑现承诺和违背承诺实际上如何影响公众对政府的支持。这篇文章探讨了政府因未兑现承诺而受到惩罚的趋势，而不是它们因兑现承诺而获得奖励的趋势。在两个大规模的高度现实的在线调查实验中(N=13,000，10,000)，在政府任期开始和中期进行的调查中，受访者得到了一系列(真实的)选举承诺。我们发现，对于政府评估来说，违背承诺往往比兑现承诺更重要，兑现承诺可能会导致非支持者的支持率下降，抵消支持者的边际收益。这些发现为政治行为的不对称性提供了有价值的证据，也为“执政成本”提供了独特的解释，“执政成本”似乎是政府在任职期间失去支持的必然趋势。
Governments often fulfill election pledges to remain in power; yet, it is unclear how pledge fulfillment and breakage actually affect public support for government. This article explores the tendency for governments to be penalized for unfulfilled pledges more than they are rewarded for fulfilled pledges. In two large-scale highly realistic online survey experiments (N = 13,000, 10,000), performed at the beginning and middle of a government’s term in office, respondents are presented with a range of (real) election pledges. We find that broken pledges often are more important to government evaluations than fulfilled pledges, and that pledge fulfillment can produce decreases in support from nonsupporters that more than offset the marginal gains among supporters. Findings provide valuable evidence on asymmetries in political behavior, and a unique account of the “cost of ruling,” the seemingly inevitable tendency for governments to lose support during their time in office.
DOI：
10.2307/2149903
发表时间：
1981-01
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Fiorina
通讯作者：
M. Fiorina
20世纪60年代科技国家的自画像：蒙特利尔、大阪世博会展品
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
Taisuke Takayama;Hirotaka Matsuda;Tomoaki Nakatani;Kuniaki Saito;野上 建紀;佐野真由子;グエン・ティ・ラン・アィン;野上 建紀;冨善一敏;稲田奈津子;佐野真由子;三田辰彦;長谷川達朗;Tatsuo Sasaki and Hanae Sasaki;佐野真由子;長谷川達朗;三田辰彦;渡辺芳郎;三田辰彦;有賀暢迪
通讯作者：
有賀暢迪