Analysis of competitive electricity markets under a new model of real-time retail pricing
Analysis of competitive electricity markets under a new model of real-time retail pricing
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DOI：
10.1109/eem.2011.5953018
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发表时间：
2011-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Roozbehanit;M. Rinehart;M. Dahleh;S. Mitter;D. Obradovic;H. Mangesius
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Roozbehanit;M. Rinehart;M. Dahleh;S. Mitter;D. Obradovic;H. Mangesius
在本文中，我们提出了一个新的实时零售定价模型，其特征是事后调整Exanté价格，并研究了由此产生的闭环系统的稳定性和有效性。根据这一定价机制，电力按现有价格(根据预测的需求计算)定价，最高可达上一时间段的消耗量。需求与上一时间段的任何偏离将按事后价格(根据实际需求计算，在消费后计算)予以处罚或补偿。假定Exanté和事后价格是根据人口的总消费计算的。因此，虽然个人消费者是价格接受者，但他可能会基于人口的平均消费来战略性地调整自己的行为。在这类定价机制中，我们考察了社会福利和价格稳定的性质。仿真结果表明，考虑个体-群体相互作用的近似动态模型比纯Exanté定价模型具有更好的稳定性和稳健性。
In this paper, we propose a new real-time retail pricing model characterized by ex-post adjustments to exanté price, and investigate the stability and efficiency properties of the resulting closed loop system. Under this pricing mechanism, electricity is priced at the exanté price (calculated based on predicted demand) up to the amount consumed at the previous time period. Any deviation of the demand from the previous time period is penalized or reimbursed at the ex-post price (calculated based on actual demand, after consumption). It is assumed that the exanté and ex-post prices are calculated based on the aggregate consumption of the population. Therefore, although an individual consumer is a price-taker, he might adjust his behavior strategically based on the mean consumption of the population. Within this class of pricing mechanisms we investigate the social welfare and price stability properties. Simulation is used to show that the approximate dynamics with individual-mass interaction has better stability and robustness properties than pure exanté pricing.