An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in the Vehicle Inspection Market
An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in the Vehicle Inspection Market
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车辆检验市场道德风险实证检验
DOI：
10.2307/2555895
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Hubbard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Hubbard
道德风险出现在“诊断-治疗”市场，如汽车修理和医疗保健，当卖方有动机歪曲买方的情况，以增加对他们提供的治疗的需求。本文研究了加州车辆排放检测市场。使用交易层面的数据，我调查市场是否提供激励，导致检查员，以帮助车辆通过和检查员的行为如何与他们的公司的组织特征不同。我发现，消费者通常能够提供公司和检查员的激励措施，以帮助他们通过，我发现跨公司的差异，与代理理论是一致的。
Moral hazard arises in "diagnosis-cure" markets such as auto repair and health care when sellers have an incentive to misrepresent a buyer's condition in order to increase demand for the treatments they supply. This article examines the market for California vehicle emission inspections. Using transaction-level data, I investigate whether the market provides incentives that lead inspectors to help vehicles pass and how the behavior of inspectors varies with their firm's organizational characteristics. I find that consumers are generally able to provide firms and inspectors incentives to help them pass, and I find cross-firm differences that are consistent with agency theory.