Screwdriver Philosophy; Searle's analysis of technical functions
Screwdriver Philosophy; Searle's analysis of technical functions
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螺丝刀哲学；
DOI：
10.5840/techne20036319
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Kroes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Kroes
在《社会现实的建构》一书中，塞尔提出了将人类建构的现实融入物理现实结构的尝试。他主要对社会对象如何适应物理对象世界的问题感兴趣，但同时他也提出了对技术对象的解释。在他的尝试过程中，他捍卫了这样一种观点，即功能被赋予了对象，这涉及到（集体）意向性。下面，我将从两点来批判塞尔的技术功能理论。我将论证塞尔未能为合理分配适当的因果代理功能（即技术功能）提供一个充分的标准。此外，我将论证Searle自己的观点，即（集体）意向性在因果代理功能的分配中起着至关重要的作用，这是有问题的。在下一节中，我将首先介绍Searle对函数的一般分析；之后，我将转向他对代理功能的分析。以下两节分别对Searle关于因果代理功能分配的必要条件和充分条件的观点，以及（集体）意向性在因果代理功能分配中的作用进行了批判性分析。
In the book The Construction of Social Reality, Searle has presented an attempt to fit humanly constructed realities into the structure of physical reality. He is mainly interested in the question how social objects fit into the world of physical objects, but en passant he also presents an interpretation of technical objects. In the course of his attempt, he defends the idea that functions are assigned to objects and that this involves (collective) intentionality. In the following, I will criticize Searle’s theory of technical functions on two points. I will argue that Searle fails to provide a sufficient criterion for the justified assignment of proper causal agentive functions (i.e., technical functions). Furthermore, I will argue that on Searle’s own account the idea that (collective) intentionality plays a crucial role in the assignment of causal agentive functions is problematic. In the next section, I will first present Searle’s analysis of functions in general; thereafter I will turn to his analysis of agentive functions. The following two sections contain a critical analysis of Searle’s views on necessary and sufficient conditions for the assignment of causal agentive functions, respectively of the role of (collective) intentionality in the assignment of causal agentive functions.