Advance booking discount strategies: Competition, information transparency and spot market
Advance booking discount strategies: Competition, information transparency and spot market
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2021.102589
复制
发表时间：
2022-01-11
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
Zhao, Xuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ma, Shanshan;Li, Guo;Zhao, Xuan
我们考虑两家相互竞争的风险中性公司（A和B），它们可以通过远期合约和波动的现货市场购买原材料。他们使用易腐烂的原料生产时令产品。原材料现货价格受其交易行为的影响，这取决于企业的市场力量程度。为了吸引在预售期以折扣价格订购产品的消费者，公司a采用了提前预订折扣策略（ABD），并从预售订单中更新需求和现货价格信息。竞争对手B公司可以不获得、部分获得或完全获得A公司的预购信息，从而导致信息不透明、部分透明或完全透明。我们首先考察公司A不提供ABD的基本情况。然后推导了三种信息透明情况下的均衡解。研究发现，当企业利润率较高且市场支配力中等时，企业A不应提供ABD；否则，它应该。采用ABD，透明度越低，A公司就能设定更高的价格。有趣的是，在某些情况下，即使公司B无法获得任何预订信息，公司B的预期利润也可能高于基本情况。另一方面，当企业的市场支配力较低时，部分透明对企业B是有利的；否则，完全透明是有利可图的。
We consider two competing risk-neutral firms (A and B) that can procure raw materials via a forward contract and in a volatile spot market. They produce seasonable products using perish-able raw materials. The raw material spot price is affected by their trading behavior depending on the extent of the firms' market powers. To attract consumers ordering products at a discount price in an advance selling period, Firm A offers an advance booking discount (ABD) strategy and updates the demand and spot price information from the pre-orders. The rival Firm B can either not obtain, partially obtain, or completely obtain pre-order information from Firm A, thereby resulting in information non-transparency, partial transparency, or full transparency, respec-tively. We initially examine the base case in which Firm A does not offer ABD. We then derive equilibrium solutions under the three cases of information transparency. We find that when the profit margin is high and firms have medium market powers, then Firm A should not offer ABD; otherwise, it should. With ABD, less transparency enables Firm A to set a higher price. Interest-ingly, the expected profit of Firm B, under certain circumstances, can be higher than in the base case even when Firm B cannot get any pre-order information. On the other hand, when firms have low market powers, partial transparency is profitable for Firm B; otherwise, full transparency is profitable.