Ultimate parent board reform and corporate overinvestment: a quasi-natural experiment study
Ultimate parent board reform and corporate overinvestment: a quasi-natural experiment study
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最终母板改革与企业过度投资：准自然实验研究
DOI：
10.1111/acfi.12443
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Zhang Junsheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Xie Sujuan;Xu Yue;Zeng Yamin;Zhang Junsheng
利用政府主导的董事会改革作为准自然实验，我们发现中国国有控股股东的董事会改革显著缓解了其上市子公司的过度投资。当国有控股股东对上市子公司的征用动机较弱，或者可以通过指派的高层管理人员对上市子公司进行更好的监督时，董事会改革对减少过度投资的积极作用更强。此外，我们发现董事会改革进一步降低了其上市子公司的管理成本。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，政府主导的董事会改革加强了国有控股股东的内部治理，并对其上市子公司的投资政策产生了积极影响。
Using government‐led board reform as a quasi‐natural experiment, we find that board reform at Chinese state controlling shareholders significantly alleviates overinvestment at their listed subsidiaries. The positive role of board reform in reducing overinvestment is stronger when state controlling shareholders have weak incentive to expropriate listed subsidiaries, or they can better monitor the listed subsidiaries through assigned top management. Furthermore, we find that board reform further reduces managerial cost at their listed subsidiaries. Overall, our findings suggest that government‐led board reform enhances internal governance at state controlling shareholders and has a positive effect on investment policy at their listed subsidiaries.