ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY
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DOI：
10.1017/s0020589320000366
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发表时间：
2020-10-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Chesterman, Simon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chesterman, Simon
随着人工智能（AI）系统变得越来越复杂，并在社会中发挥更大的作用，他们应该有某种形式的法律的人格的论点越来越可信。这些论点通常是以工具性术语为框架的，并与公司等法人进行比较。这些论点中隐含的，或在他们的插图和例子中明确的是，随着人工智能系统接近人类的不可分割点，它们应该有权获得与自然人相当的地位。本文认为，虽然大多数法律的制度都可以创造一个新的法律的人类别，但这些论点不足以表明它们应该这样做。
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become more sophisticated and play a larger role in society, arguments that they should have some form of legal personality gain credence. The arguments are typically framed in instrumental terms, with comparisons to juridical persons such as corporations. Implicit in those arguments, or explicit in their illustrations and examples, is the idea that as AI systems approach the point of indistinguishability from humans they should be entitled to a status comparable to natural persons. This article contends that although most legal systems could create a novel category of legal persons, such arguments are insufficient to show that they should.