Towards Resilient 5G: Lessons Learned from Experimental Evaluations of LTE Uplink Jamming
Towards Resilient 5G: Lessons Learned from Experimental Evaluations of LTE Uplink Jamming
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迈向弹性 5G：从 LTE 上行链路干扰实验评估中汲取的经验教训
DOI：
10.1109/iccw.2019.8756977
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Wietfeld
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Girke;Fabian Kurtz;N. Dorsch;C. Wietfeld
能源、水、卫生、交通和紧急服务是我们社会的支柱。为了提高效率，这些系统越来越自动化，这取决于通信系统。然而，这使得这些关键的网络结构容易受到网络攻击，导致数据泄露，性能降低甚至整个系统故障。除了调查现有的漏洞，我们提供了一个实验评估针对长期演进（LTE）的空中接口的上行干扰。首先，我们对LTE物理上行链路控制信道（PUCCH）、物理上行链路共享信道（PUSCH）以及无线电接入过程的智能攻击的实现进行了概述和测试。在利用未加密的资源分配过程中，这些攻击能够瞄准和干扰特定的UE资源，有效地拒绝上行链路接入。评估结果揭示了这种攻击的严重性，严重破坏了关键网络结构的稳定，同时最大限度地减少了攻击者的暴露。最后，我们为5G利益相关者提出了可能的缓解措施和建议，这有助于提高使命关键通信的鲁棒性，并实现弹性下一代移动的网络的设计。
Energy, water, health, transportation and emergency services act as backbones for our society. Aiming at high degrees of efficiency, these systems are increasingly automated, depending on communication systems. However, this makes these Critical Infrastructures prone to cyber attacks, resulting in data leaks, reduced performance or even total system failure. Beyond a survey of existing vulnerabilities, we provide an experimental evaluation of targeted uplink jamming against Long Term Evolution (LTE)'s air interface. Primarily, our implementations of smart attacks on the LTE Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH), the Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) as well as on the radio access procedure are outlined and tested. In exploiting the unencrypted resource assignment process, these attacks are able to target and jam specific UE resources, effectively denying uplink access. Evaluation results reveal the criticality of such attacks, severely destabilizing Critical Infrastructures, while minimizing attacker exposure. Finally we derive possible mitigations and recommendations for 5G stakeholders, which serve to improve the robustness of mission critical communications and enable the design of resilient next generation mobile networks.