The illusion of transparency: Biased assessments of others' ability to read one's emotional states
The illusion of transparency: Biased assessments of others' ability to read one's emotional states
复制标题
DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.75.2.332
复制
发表时间：
1998-08-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Medvec, VH
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gilovich, T;Savitsky, K;Medvec, VH
有三组研究提供了证据，证明了一种透明的错觉，或者说人们倾向于高估他人能够辨别自己内心状态的程度。人们经常错误地认为他们的内部状态“泄漏”比他们真正做的更多。作者将这种偏见归因于人们在试图从另一个人的角度出发时，对自己的现象学经验的“锚”调整不足的倾向。这种错觉的证据是，说谎者高估了他们谎言的可检测性（研究1a，1b和1c），人们认为他们的厌恶感比实际更明显（研究2a和2b）。最后一对实验（研究3a和3b）探讨了透明度错觉对人们不愿干预紧急情况的影响。所有3组研究也提供了与提议的锚定和调整解释一致的证据。
Three sets of studies provide evidence for an illusion of transparency, or a tendency for people to overestimate the extent to which others can discern their internal states. People often mistakenly believe that their internal states "leak out" more than they really do. The authors attribute this bias to a tendency for people to adjust insufficiently from the ''anchor'' of their own phenomenological experience when attempting to take another's perspective. Evidence for this illusion is provided by showing that liars overestimate the detectability of their lies (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c) and that people believe their feelings of disgust are more apparent than they actually are (Studies 2a and 2b). A final pair of experiments (Studies 3a and 3b) explores the implications of the illusion of transparency for people's reluctance to intervene in emergencies. All 3 sets of studies also provide evidence consistent with the proposed anchoring and adjustment interpretation.