Allocation of decision rights among two parties with asymmetric bargaining powers in bidirectional open innovation
Allocation of decision rights among two parties with asymmetric bargaining powers in bidirectional open innovation
复制标题
双向开放创新中议价能力不对称的两方决策权分配
DOI：
10.1007/s43546-023-00473-w
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Shin’ya Okuda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takaya Kubota;Shin’ya Okuda
本研究探讨了双向开放创新环境中具有不同议价能力的两方之间决策权的分配。我们引入广义纳什讨价还价解决方案，以允许事后谈判中不平等的讨价还价能力。因此，我们建议拥有签约权的一方根据其议价能力释放决策权。此外，我们提出，创新价值最大化或高效创新实现的决策权最佳配置依赖于讨价还价能力，并且是自愿实现的。最后，我们指出，存在事后讨价还价能力不对称导致合作失败的情况。我们的结论是，事后讨价还价能力在影响激励分配和开放创新成果方面发挥着至关重要的作用。
This study explores the allocation of decision rights between two parties with different bargaining powers in a bidirectional open innovation setting. We introduce the generalized Nash bargaining solution to allow for unequal bargaining power in ex-post negotiation. As a result, we propose that the party with contracting power releases decision rights depending on its bargaining power. In addition, we propose that the best allocation of decision rights for the maximization of innovation value or the realization of efficient innovation depends on bargaining power and is achieved voluntarily. Lastly, we point out that there are cases in which asymmetric ex-post bargaining power leads to collaboration failure. We conclude that ex-post bargaining power plays a crucial role in influencing the allocation of incentives and the outcomes of open innovation.