Protecting Free Trade: The Political Economy of Rules of Origin
Protecting Free Trade: The Political Economy of Rules of Origin
复制标题
保护自由贸易：原产地规则的政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Kerry A. Chase
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kerry A. Chase
自由贸易协定（fta）中原产地规则的设计引发了激烈的游说活动，而这些活动大多没有引起公众的注意。本文认为，通常最支持自由贸易协定的国内集团对原产地规则的偏好不同：规模回报高的行业倾向于严格的原产地规则，以在自由贸易协定中获得规模经济，而拥有跨国供应链的行业则倾向于宽松的原产地规则，以适应离岸采购。对北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）原产地规则的计量经济学分析发现，更严格的原产地规则，外部贸易保护程度越高，规模回报越大，更宽松的原产地规则，参与国外采购的程度就越大。研究结果表明，原产地规则可能对建立自由贸易协定的国内联盟至关重要。因此，行业对原产地规则的偏好对FTA批准的政治意义重大。
The design of rules of origin in free trade agreements (FTAs) arouses spirited lobbying campaigns that mostly escape public attention. This article argues that the domestic groups generally most favorable to FTAs differ in their preferences over rules of origin: industries with large returns to scale favor strict rules of origin to gain scale economies in an FTA, while industries with multinational supply chains prefer lenient rules of origin to accommodate offshore procurement. An econometric analysis of rules of origin in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) finds tougher rules of origin the higher the external trade protection and the larger the returns to scale, and more permissive rules of origin the greater the involvement in foreign sourcing. The results suggest that rules of origin may be critical to building domestic coalitions for FTAs. Industry preferences toward rules of origin therefore have important implications for the politics of FTA ratification.