The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory
The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory
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情感体验的现象特征：感知理论的审视
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
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通讯作者：
A. Lutz
中科院分区：
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作者：
A. Lutz
在本文中，我将考察知觉哲学中的不同观点是否有助于我们解释和理解情感体验的现象特征。在介绍了可能立场的范围之后，我考虑了质论、还原的纯粹意向主义和还原的不纯粹意向主义。我认为，质理论可以很容易地解释为什么情绪是现象状态，但它不能占“不可分割的联系命题”，这是相当突出的情感哲学。还原的纯粹和不纯粹的意向主义，反过来，似乎更符合这一论点，但他们有困难解释是什么使情绪现象状态。因此，我最后讨论了非还原的意向主义是否可以解释情感体验的现象特征。
In this paper I examine whether different suggestions made in the philosophy of perception can help us to explain and understand the phenomenal character of emotional experience. After having introduced the range of possible positions, I consider qualia-theory, reductive pure intentionalism and reductive impure intentionalism. I argue that qualia-theory can easily explain why emotions are phenomenal states at all but that it cannot account for the “inextricable link thesis” which is quite prominent in the philosophy of emotion. Reductive pure and impure intentionalism, in turn, seem to fit better with this thesis but they have difficulties to explain what makes emotions phenomenal states at all. Therefore, I finally discuss whether non-reductive intentionalism might be an option for explaining the phenomenal character of emotional experience.