Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem
Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem
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福利主义结果主义、态度相似性和阿罗一般不可能性定理
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-003-0284-0
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Yongsheng Xu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Suzumura;Yongsheng Xu
摘要。阿罗的社会选择理论有两个特点。第一个特征是福利主义-结果主义，它不仅将社会对行为的对错判断建立在对其后果的评估上，而且还从人们的福利而不是其他方面来评估后果。第二个特征是人们对社会结果的态度的相似性，这是阿罗不可能性定理的一个可能解决方案。两个扩展框架，一个结果主义和另一个非结果主义，被发展。这两种框架都承认阿罗的一般不可能性定理的一些有趣的解决方案，这与阿罗自己的观点形成了鲜明的对比。
Abstract.Two features of Arrow’s social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of people’s welfare and nothing else. The second feature is a similarity of people’s attitudes towards social outcomes as a possible resolvent of the Arrow impossibility theorem. Two extended frameworks, one consequentialist and the other non-consequentialist, are developed. Both frameworks are shown to admit some interesting resolutions of Arrow’s general impossibility theorem, which are rather sharply contrasting with Arrow’s own perspective.