Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers
Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers
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DOI：
10.1002/nav.20430
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发表时间：
2010-12
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
X. L. Luo-X. L.-Luo-2183995501;Yanmin Jiang;Q. Hu
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文献类型：
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作者：
X. L. Luo-X. L.-Luo-2183995501;Yanmin Jiang;Q. Hu
本文研究了一个制造商向多个异质零售商供应某种产品，并希望通过批发价格和持有成本补贴来协调供应链的供应链协调问题。零售价格既可以是外生的，也可以是内生的。市场需求由基于所有零售商的货架空间和零售价格的市场份额吸引力模型描述。我们得到了集中式供应链的最优解，其中最优零售定价是众所周知的成本加定价策略的修改版本。进一步得到了制造商协调混合分散供应链的可行契约。当零售价格是外生的时，制造商可以通过批发价格将总利润自由分配给自己和零售市场，否则就不能。最后指出零售市场的不同特征是由于制造商的不同权力造成的，制造商的权力越大，协调供应链的契约就越简单。© 2010 Wiley Periodicals，Inc.海军研究后勤，2010年
We consider supply chain coordination in which a manufacturer supplies some product to multiple heterogeneous retailers and wishes to coordinate the supply chain via wholesale price and holding cost subsidy. The retail price is either exogenous or endogenous. The market demand is described by the market share attraction model based on all retailers'shelf‐spaces and retail prices. We obtain optimal solutions for the centralized supply chain, where the optimal retail pricing is a modified version of the well‐known cost plus pricing strategy. We further get feasible contracts for the manufacturer to coordinate the hybrid and decentralized supply chains. The manufacturer can allocate the total profit free to himself and the retail market via the wholesale price when the retail price is exogenous, but otherwise he cannot. Finally, we point out that different characteristics of the retail market are due to different powers of the manufacturer, and the more power the manufacturer has, the simpler the contract to coordinate the chain will be. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010