Protection and International Sourcing
Protection and International Sourcing
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保护和国际采购
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02462.x
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
John L. Turner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Ornelas;John L. Turner
我们研究进口保护对特定关系投资、组织选择和福利的影响。我们证明，对中间投入征收关税可以通过减轻滞留问题来改善社会福利。如果它对投资方实行歧视，从而提高其讨价还价的地位，那么它就会这样做。另一方面，如果关税有利于生产力较低的企业或整合成本较低，则可能会导致低效的组织选择。保护扭曲了组织选择，因为企业外部的关税收入在离岸外包和一体化方面造成了私人收益和社会收益之间的隔阂。
We study the impact of import protection on relationship-specific investments, organizational choice and welfare. We show that a tariff on intermediate inputs can improve social welfare through mitigating hold-up problems. It does so if it discriminates in favor of the investing party, thereby improving its bargaining position. On the other hand, a tariff can prompt inefficient organizational choices if it discriminates in favor of less productive firms or if integration costs are low. Protection distorts organizational choices because tariff revenue, which is external to the firms, drives a wedge between the private and social gains to offshoring and integration.