Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble
Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble
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真理制定者和本体论承诺：或者如何在不陷入麻烦的情况下处理复杂的对象和数学本体论
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-008-9223-3
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
R. Cameron
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Cameron
句子的本体论承诺是什么？在这篇文章中，我从真理缔造者理论家的角度给出了一个答案，与我们熟悉的奎因标准形成了对比。我详述了以这种方式思考事物的一些好处：它们包括使作文辩论变得容易处理，而不诉诸新卡纳皮亚的后生论，理解新弗莱格主义，以及消除一些原本顽固的必要联系。
What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.