The stability of hedonic coalition structures
The stability of hedonic coalition structures
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DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0877
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发表时间：
2002-02-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Jackson, MO
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bogomolnaia, A;Jackson, MO
我们考虑在纯粹的享乐环境下将一个社会划分为多个联盟，即每个参与者的收益完全由联盟中其他成员的身份决定。我们首先讨论了特征集与非特征集的区别，以及特征集下存在核心稳定联盟划分的一些充分条件。然后我们关注较弱的稳定条件：个人稳定，在这种情况下，任何玩家都不能从转移到另一个联盟中受益，而不会伤害到那个新联盟的成员。我们证明了，如果联盟可以根据某些特征进行排序，那么存在一个单独稳定的联盟划分。实例表明，如果没有这些条件，单独稳定的联盟划分可能不存在。我们还讨论了一些其他稳定性的概念，以及稳定性与其他规范性质的不相容。(C)2002年爱思唯尔科学公司。
We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, i.e., where each player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition. We first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings. We then focus on a weaker stability condition: individual stability, where no player can benefit from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition. We show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition. Examples show that without these conditions, individually stable coalition partitions may not exist. We also discuss some other stability concepts, and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.