The declining advantages of democracy - A combined model of war outcomes and duration
The declining advantages of democracy - A combined model of war outcomes and duration
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DOI：
10.1177/0022002798042003007
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发表时间：
1998-06-01
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Stam, AC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bennett, DS;Stam, AC
作者估计了一个动态模型来评估民主对战争结果的影响，以及这些影响如何随时间变化。作者利用1816年至1990年间国家间战争的定量数据，证明了民主国家在战时积累的优势是短暂的。在短期内，民主国家比他们的专制对手更有可能获胜。然而，尽管专制政权在短期战争中明显处于劣势，但随着时间的推移，它们放弃的可能性要小得多。这种继续战斗的意愿最终导致的结果是，大约18个月后，优势转移到了独裁者手中。在这一点上，民主国家比专制国家更有可能退出，更愿意接受平局或失败。作者还发现，战争结果与许多控制变量（如军工能力和军事战略）之间的关系随着时间的推移而变化。
The authors estimate a dynamic model to assess the effects of democracy on war outcomes and how these effects vary over time. Using quantitative data drawn from interstate wars between 1816 and 1990, the authors demonstrate that the wartime advantages that accrue to democratic states are fleeting. In the short run, democracies are more likely to win than are their autocratic opponents. However, although they are at an apparent disadvantage in short wars, autocracies are far less likely to quit as time passes. This willingness to continue fighting ultimately leads to the result that after roughly 18 months have passed, the advantage passes to the autocrat. Democracies at that point become far more likely than autocratic states to quit and more willing to settle for draws or losses. The authors also find that relationships between war outcomes and a number of control variables such as military-industrial capacity and military strategy vary over time.