Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality
Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality
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契约二元论、市场力量和非正规性
DOI：
10.1111/ecoj.12222
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Kanbur
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Basu;Nancy H. Chau;R. Kanbur
在关于发展中国家的非正式和正式的学术和政策文献中，经常可以发现两种程式化的表述。第一，非正规（或不受管制）部门比正规（或受管制）部门更具竞争力。第二，正规部门的合同执行比非正规部门容易，这正是因为正规部门属于国家监管的范围。本文的基本论点是，这两种表示是不兼容的。我们开发了一个搜索理论模型的劳动力市场中的合同二元论，无法承诺的合同在非正式部门导致雇主的市场力量在均衡，而在正式部门强制执行的最低工资为雇主提供了一个承诺的技术，但减少了他们的市场力量在均衡。本文的贡献有三个方面。它（i）由于正式和非正式部门的契约二元论，为这两个部门内雇主市场力量的内生决定提供了微观基础，（ii）提供了一个统一和连贯的结构，从而可以一起解释发展中国家劳动力市场的许多显著特征，和（iii）将最优的原始斯蒂格勒处方（失业最小化）最低工资在更广泛的劳动力市场的背景下，正规就业创造成本高，正规就业，非正规就业和失业并存。
Two stylized representations are often found in the academic and policy literature on informality and formality in developing countries. The first is that the informal (or unregulated) sector is more competitive than the formal (or regulated) sector. The second is that contract enforcement is easier in the formal sector than in the informal sector, precisely because the formal sector comes under the purview of state regulation. The basic contention of this paper is that these two representations are not compatible with each other. We develop a search-theoretic model of contractual dualism in the labor market where the inability to commit to contracts in the informal sector leads to employer market power in equilibrium, while an enforced minimum wage in the formal sector provides employers with a commitment technology but which reduces their market power in equilibrium. The contributions of this paper are three-fold. It (i) provides the micro-underpinnings for endogenous determination of employer market power in the formal and informal sectors due to contractual dualism in the two sectors, (ii) offers a unified and coherent setup whereby a host of salient features of developing country labor markets can be explained together, and (iii) places the original Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment minimizing) minimum wage in the broader context of labor markets where formal job creation is costly, and where formal employment, informal employment, and unemployment co-exist.
日韩企业数字家电的全球竞争（一）
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
現代コリア 第462号
影响因子：
--
作者：
古川一郎;上原渉;Kaoru Sugihara;坂野友昭(with Kevin E. Voss et al.);田中道雄;林廣茂;Takashi Oishi;田中 道雄;高井透;田中道雄;林廣茂
通讯作者：
林廣茂