Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets ∗
Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets ∗
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双边市场中的质量外部性和声誉限制*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
S. Tadelis
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作者：
Chris Nosko;S. Tadelis
双边市场平台中的买家可以从任何一笔交易中得出关于平台质量的结论。这就导致了一种外部性，而这种外部性是声誉机制无法缓解的。此外，买家在没有留下反馈的情况下放弃平台，会导致卖家的声誉受到影响。使用eBay的数据，我们记录了这种外部性，并认为平台可以通过积极筛选卖家和促进更优质卖家的突出来减轻这种外部性。利用反馈中的偏见，我们创建了一个衡量卖家质量的标准，并通过一个控制实验来展示我们方法的好处，该实验将质量更好的卖家优先于随机的买家子集。因此，我们强调了双边市场外部性的重要性，并制定了一个旨在创建更现实的双边市场模型的议程。我们感谢eBay的许多员工和高管，如果没有他们，这项研究就不可能实现。我们从反馈中受益... [2]芝加哥大学和eBay研究实验室。电子邮件：cnosko@chicagobooth.edu加州大学伯克利分校和eBay研究实验室。电子邮件地址：stadelis@haas.berkeley.edu
Buyers in two-sided marketplace platforms may draw conclusions about the quality of the platform from any single transaction. This induces an externality across sellers that reputation mechanisms will not alleviate. Furthermore, buyers who abandon the platform without leaving feedback will cause seller reputations to be biased. Using data from eBay, we document this externality and argue that platforms can mitigate it by actively screening sellers and promoting the prominence of better quality sellers. Exploiting the bias in feedback, we create a measure of seller quality and demonstrate the benefits of our approach through a controlled experiment that prioritizes better quality sellers to a random subset of buyers. We thus highlight the importance of externalities in two-sided markets and chart an agenda that aims to create more realistic models of two-sided markets. ∗We thank many employees and executives at eBay whom without this research could not have been possible. We have benefited from feedback... †University of Chicago and eBay Research Labs. Email: cnosko@chicagobooth.edu ‡UC Berkeley and eBay Research Labs. Email: stadelis@haas.berkeley.edu