Payment for Environmental "Self-Service": Exploring the Links Between Farmers' Motivation and Additionality in a Conservation Incentive Programme in the Bolivian Andes
Payment for Environmental "Self-Service": Exploring the Links Between Farmers' Motivation and Additionality in a Conservation Incentive Programme in the Bolivian Andes
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.032
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发表时间：
2018-08-01
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
Jones, Julia P. G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bottazzi, Patrick;Wiik, Emma;Jones, Julia P. G.
新古典经济学对环境服务支付（PES）的解释，假设参与者权衡成本和收益，为更复杂的分析腾出空间。然而，PES计划如何与现有的保护动机相互作用，资助保护的程度是额外的，以及变化的可能持久性的证据仍然很少。我们对玻利维亚农民旨在减少河岸森林放牧（n = 428）和森林砍伐（n = 912）的合同结果进行了分类，根据合同是否不合适、不合规、非额外或额外（PES计划的圣杯）进行了分类，并探讨了农民报告的动机与额外保护资金的程度之间的关系。高达39%的不包括牲畜的合同和14%的防止森林砍伐的合同似乎是额外的。如果参与的动机是自然的工具价值（如提供清洁水），那么将牛排除在河岸森林之外的合同更有可能代表额外的保护。我们认为，该计划在一定程度上起到了我们所说的“支付环境自助服务”的作用；也就是说，外部激励能够改变农民的行为，这种行为的动机是农民认识到他们从激励的管理变化中获得的环境利益。
Neoclassical economic interpretations of Payment for Environmental Services (PES), which assume that participants weigh up costs and benefits, are making room for more complex analyses. However, there is still little evidence of how PES programmes interact with existing motivations to conserve, the extent to which funded conservation is additional, and the likely permanence of changes. We categorized the outcome of contracts aiming to reduce cattle grazing in riparian forest (n = 428) and deforestation (n = 912) by Bolivian farmers in terms of whether they were unsuitable, non-compliant, non-additional, or additional (the holy grail of PES programmes) and explored the relationship between farmers' reported motivations and the extent to which the conservation funded was additional. Up to 39% of contracts to exclude cattle, and 14% to prevent deforestation appear to be additional. Where participation is motivated by the instrumental values of nature (such as provision of clean water) contracts to exclude cattle from riparian forest are more likely to represent additional conservation. We suggest that the programme is partly acting as what we term 'payment for environmental self-service'; i.e. the external incentives enable changes in behaviour motivated by farmers' perceptions of environmental benefits they receive from the management changes incentivized.