Individual and Cooperative Management of Invasive Species in Human‐Mediated Landscapes
Individual and Cooperative Management of Invasive Species in Human‐Mediated Landscapes
复制标题
人为景观中入侵物种的个体和合作管理
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Wilen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Epanchin‐Niell;J. Wilen
当生物入侵从它的入侵点开始在整个景观中传播时，损害大致随着距离原始入侵的距离的平方而增加。因此，在景观尺度上，如果不是在发现后立即实施根除或遏制控制，也是早期实施的。然而，个人财产所有者只会考虑控制自己财产的成本和收益，而不是潜在的潜在损失。因此，在一个自由放任制度下运作的独立所有者的环境中，生物入侵通常会受到控制。因此，需要建立一种机制，促使合作社及早捐款，以控制受益人的费用，因为如果没有这些捐款，受益人以后就会被侵占。我们开发了一个空间上明确的，入侵蔓延和人类行为的综合模型，以研究不同程度的空间合作如何影响入侵蔓延的模式和总成本和损害。我们比较个人自由放任，相邻的邻居合作控制，合作控制组，包括更远，但附近的邻居。正如预期的那样，在大多数情况下，相对于社会最优控制，私人自由放任的控制决策往往会控制不住入侵。但是，只要合作的地理范围不大，就可以获得相当高比例的第一最佳收益。我们还发现，不太广泛的合作，需要控制入侵的成本和损害，否则会导致最大的外部性（与损害相比，成本相对较低的情况下）。这表明，即使是少量的合作，以控制生物入侵可以提供巨大的社会效益。
As a bioinvasion spreads across a landscape from its point of introduction, damages rise roughly with the square of the distance from the original invasion. It is thus generally beneficial, at the landscape scale, to apply eradication or containment controls early if not immediately upon discovery. However, an individual property owner only has incentives to consider the costs and benefits of control on his/her own property rather than potential landscape-scale damages. Bioinvasions will therefore generally be under-controlled in a landscape of independent owners operating under a laissez-faire system. A mechanism is thus needed to induce early cooperative contributions to control costs from beneficiaries who would, without them, be invaded later. We develop a spatially-explicit, integrated model of invasion spread and human behavior to examine how different degrees of spatial cooperation affect patterns of invasion spread and the total costs and damages imposed. We compare individual laissez-faire, cooperative control by adjacent neighbors, and cooperative control by groups including more distant but nearby neighbors. As expected, private laissez-faire control decisions tend to under-control the invasion relative to socially optimal control under most circumstances. But a reasonably high fraction of first best payoffs can be achieved with only a modest geographical reach of cooperation. We also find that less extensive cooperation is needed to control invasions whose costs and damages otherwise lead to the largest externalities (circumstances with costs that are relatively low compared with damages). This suggests that even small amounts of cooperation to control bioinvasions can provide large social benefits.