Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
复制标题
对公共项目的动态自愿捐款
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Steven A. Matthews
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Marx;Steven A. Matthews
我们认为，动态私人资金提供给一个项目，产生公共利益流。例子包括为公共电视或大学建筑提供资金。我们所研究的博弈都有关于收益的完整信息，允许每个参与人在每个阶段做出贡献，并且让每个参与人只观察其他参与人过去贡献的总和。对称纳什均衡结果的特点，并显示也是完美的贝叶斯均衡结果。如果接受贡献的阶段数足够大，参与者足够耐心，或者阶段长度足够短，那么均衡就存在，在均衡中，项目最终或渐进地完成。具有这些特征的一些均衡是马尔可夫完美的。在某些情况下，随着周期长度的增加，完工时间缩短到零--搭便车在极限内消失。这些结果与其他模型的结果相反，在这些模型中，允许重复的贡献避免了搭便车问题。
We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to a project that generates a flow of public benefits. Examples include fund drives for public television or university buildings. The games we study have complete information about payoffs, allow each player to contribute each period, and let each player observe only the aggregate of the other players' past contributions. The symmetric Nash equilibrium outcomes are characterized and shown to be also perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. If the number of periods in which contributions are accepted is large enough, and the players are patient or the period length is short enough, equilibria exist in which the project is eventually or asymptotically completed. Some equilibria with these features are Markov perfect. In some, the time to completion shrinks to zero with the period length--free riding vanishes in the limit. These results are in contrast to those of other models in which allowing repetitive contributions worsens the free riding problem.