Lay Epistemic Theory: The Motivational, Cognitive, and Social Aspects of Knowledge Formation
Lay Epistemic Theory: The Motivational, Cognitive, and Social Aspects of Knowledge Formation
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00308.x
复制
发表时间：
2010-10-01
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Pierro, Antonio
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kruglanski, Arie W.;Orehek, Edward;Pierro, Antonio
我们回顾并整合了源自外行认识论理论的三个独立的研究项目（Kruglanski, A. W.(1989)。外行认识论和人类知识：认知和动机基础。纽约：全会）。认知封闭的需要是一种认知动机，它推动知识的形成，并对个人、人际和群体现象产生广泛的影响。单一模型研究从“给出的信息”形成新知识的过程。关于认知权威的工作强调了社会源效应（包括自我作为源）在人类认知行为中的中心地位。这三个研究项目研究了认知行为的各个方面，这些行为相互依赖地发挥作用，产生指导个人和社会功能的知识。
We review and integrate three separate research programs emanating from the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, A. W.(1989). Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge: Cognitive and Motivational Bases. New York: Plenum). The need for cognitive closure is an epistemic motivation that propels knowledge formation and has widely ramifying consequences for individual, interpersonal, and group phenomena. The unimodel investigates the process of new knowledge formation from the 'information given.' The work on epistemic authority highlights the centrality of social source effects, including the self as a source, in human epistemic behavior. These three research programs examine facets of epistemic behavior that function interdependently to produce the knowledge that guides individual and social functioning.