Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets
Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets
复制标题
不对称寡头垄断市场中的战略环境政策和国际贸易
DOI：
10.1023/a:1016268213772
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
S. Hamilton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Duval;S. Hamilton
本文研究了最优合作和非合作环境税的情况下，污染的投入是用来生产国际贸易的成品。该模型允许寡头垄断下的贸易条件的影响，并采用了一般规格的环境损害功能，包括特殊情况下的本地，全球和跨界的外部性。该模型对公共财政有几个影响。例如，低效率的高环境税对处于非合作情况下的净出口国来说可能是最佳的，因为通过选择低效率的低税率来转移租金的动机被将税收负担转移给外国消费者的动机所抵消。研究结果确定了不对称贸易流动（以商品和污染交换计价）在寡头垄断下确定最佳合作和非合作税收政策方面的重要作用。
This paper examines optimal cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes for the case in which a polluting input is used to produce an internationally-traded finished product. The model allows for terms-of-trade effects under oligopoly and employs a general specification of the environmental damage function that encompasses special cases of local, global, and transboundary externalities. The model has several implications for public finance. For example, inefficiently high environmental taxes may be optimal for a net exporting country in non-cooperative circumstances, as the motive to shift rent by selecting an inefficiently low tax rate is countervailed by the incentive to shift the burden of the tax to foreign consumers. The findings identify the important role of asymmetric trade flows (denominated in both goods and pollution exchange) in determining optimal cooperative and non-cooperative tax policy under oligopoly.