Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain
Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain
复制标题
监管机构和公司讨价还价时的工具选择
DOI：
10.1006/jeem.1998.1032
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
A. Malik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Amacher;A. Malik
摘要我们比较了排放税和排放标准的结果，当企业和监管机构从事合作谈判的监管的严密性。讨价还价的动机是让企业选择减排技术。如果企业的首选技术与监管者的不同，那么最优结果就不是传统非合作博弈的均衡，在这种博弈中，监管者是斯塔克尔伯格式的领导者。因此，如果该公司同意转换技术，监管机构可能会选择对其给予更宽松的监管。我们发现，即使信息是对称的，所产生的讨价还价结果也会因税收和标准而有所不同，并且我们确定了每种工具产生较低社会成本的条件。
Abstract We compare outcomes with an emissions tax and an emissions standard when a firm and regulator engage in cooperative bargaining over the stringency of the regulation. Bargaining is motivated by giving the firm a choice of abatement technologies. If the firm's preferred technology differs from the regulator's, the first-best outcome is not an equilibrium of the traditional noncooperative game in which the regulator is a Stackelberg leader. The regulator may therefore choose to offer the firm a more lenient regulation if it agrees to switch technologies. We find that the resulting bargaining outcomes differ for a tax and a standard even though information is symmetric, and we identify conditions under which each instrument yields lower social costs.