Power grid state estimation after a cyber-physical attack under the AC power flow model
Power grid state estimation after a cyber-physical attack under the AC power flow model
复制标题
交流潮流模型下网络物理攻击后的电网状态估计
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Zussman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Saleh Soltan;G. Zussman
在本文中，我们提出了一种算法，用于估计网络物理攻击后的电网状态。我们假设对手通过以下方式攻击一个区域：（i）断开该区域内的某些线路（故障线路），以及（ii）阻止该区域内的信息到达控制中心。该算法在给定受攻击区域外母线相位角的情况下，利用交流潮流模型（攻击前后）估计出受攻击区域内母线相位角，并检测出受攻击区域内的故障线路。我们的方法的新奇是变换的线路故障检测问题，这是组合的性质，凸优化问题。其结果是，我们的算法可以检测到任何数量的线路故障的运行时间是独立的故障的数量，仅取决于网络的大小。据我们所知，这是第一个凸松弛的交流潮流模型下的线路故障检测使用相角测量的问题。我们评估我们的算法在IEEE 118-和300-总线系统的性能，并表明，它估计的相位角的总线小于1%的误差，并可以检测线路故障与80%的准确度为单，双，三线故障。
In this paper, we present an algorithm for estimating the state of the power grid following a cyber-physical attack. We assume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting some lines within that area (failed lines), and (ii) obstructing the information from within the area to reach the control center. Given the phase angles of the buses outside the attacked area under the AC power flow model (before and after the attack), the algorithm estimates the phase angles of the buses and detects the failed lines inside the attacked area. The novelty of our approach is the transformation of the line failures detection problem, which is combinatorial in nature, to a convex optimization problem. As a result, our algorithm can detect any number of line failures in a running time that is independent of the number of failures and is solely dependent on the size of the network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first convex relaxation for the problem of line failures detection using phase angle measurements under the AC power flow model. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm in the IEEE 118- and 300-bus systems, and show that it estimates the phase angles of the buses with less that 1% error, and can detect the line failures with 80% accuracy for single, double, and triple line failures.