The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation
The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation
复制标题
银行业监管的国内政治
DOI：
10.1017/s0020818303572034
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Ross D. Schaap
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Rosenbluth;Ross D. Schaap
本文试图在国内政治的基础上进行金融监管选择。基于来自22个工业化国家的证据，我们认为，选举规则，特别是，在何种程度上，他们是离心或向心力，有显着的影响，无论是银行或其消费者支付银行系统的安全。此外，尽管全球金融一体化产生了负面影响，但这些选举规则所产生的政治动态继续影响着各国取代银行业卡特尔所采取的审慎监管的性质和程度。
This article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from twenty-two industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules—specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal—have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Moreover, despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.