Cryptanalysis of the RCES/RSES image encryption scheme
Cryptanalysis of the RCES/RSES image encryption scheme
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jss.2007.07.037
复制
发表时间：
2008-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Shujun Li;Chengqing Li;Guanrong Chen;K. Lo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shujun Li;Chengqing Li;Guanrong Chen;K. Lo
最近，一种基于混沌的图像加密方案RCES（也称为RSES）被提出。本文分析了RCES的安全性，指出RCES对已知/选择明文攻击是不安全的：攻击成功所需的已知/选择明文图像的数目仅为1或2。此外，RCES对暴力攻击的安全性被高估了。理论和实验分析表明，建议的已知/选择明文攻击的性能。RCES的不安全性是由于其特殊的设计，这使其成为不安全图像加密方案的典型例子。从RCES的密码分析报告中吸取了一些经验教训，从而提出了一些共同的原则，以确保高水平的安全性的图像加密方案。
Recently, a chaos-based image encryption scheme called RCES (also called RSES) was proposed. This paper analyses the security of RCES, and points out that it is insecure against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks: the number of required known/chosen plain-images is only one or two to succeed an attack. In addition, the security of RCES against the brute-force attack was overestimated. Both theoretical and experimental analyses are given to show the performance of the suggested known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The insecurity of RCES is due to its special design, which makes it a typical example of insecure image encryption schemes. A number of lessons are drawn from the reported cryptanalysis of RCES, consequently suggesting some common principles for ensuring a high level of security of an image encryption scheme.