Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China
Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China
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DOI：
10.1093/aler/ahi008
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发表时间：
2005-03
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Katharina Pistor;Chenggang Xu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katharina Pistor;Chenggang Xu
事实证明，在转型经济体启动股票市场是困难的。这些国家缺乏有效的法律的治理结构，面临严重的信息问题。然而，并非所有金融市场都因为不利条件而失败。本文以中国证券市场发展初期为例，提出行政治理可以替代正式的法律的治理。这种治理结构的核心是配额制度。它为区域竞争和IPO阶段分散的信息收集创造了激励措施。如本报告所示，当各地区的公司倒闭时，也用它来惩罚各地区和负责官员。版权所有2005年，牛津大学出版社。
Jump-starting stock markets in transition economies has proved difficult. These countries lack effective legal governance structures and face severe information problems. Yet not all financial markets failed because of adverse conditions. Using China's initial stock market development as a case study, this article suggests that administrative governance can substitute for formal legal governance. At the core of this governance structure was the quota system. It created incentives for regional competition and decentralized information collection at the IPO stage. It was also used to punish regions and responsible officials when companies from their regions failed, as evidenced herein. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.