Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets
Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.100.4.1523
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发表时间：
2010-09-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Ventura, Jaume
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Broner, Fernando;Martin, Alberto;Ventura, Jaume
传统观点认为，在没有违约惩罚的情况下，主权风险会摧毁所有外国资产交易。我们表明，这种传统智慧建立在一个隐含的假设之上：资产不能在二级市场上再交易。没有这一假设，即使没有违约处罚，对外资产交易也是可能的。这一结果表明，对于主权风险的起源及其补救措施，人们有了更广阔的视角。只有在违约惩罚力度不够、二级市场运作不完善的情况下，主权风险才会影响外国资产交易。为了减少其影响，可以增加违约处罚或改善二级市场的运作。（凝胶f34， g12, g15）
Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets. (JEL F34, G12, G15)