Complex Tax Incentives: An Experimental Investigation
Complex Tax Incentives: An Experimental Investigation
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2263649
复制
发表时间：
2013-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Johannes Abeler;Simon Jäger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johannes Abeler;Simon Jäger
税收复杂性如何影响人们对税收变化的反应？为了回答这个问题，我们进行了一项实验，让受试者按计件工资工作，并缴纳税款。一种待遇是简单的，另一种是复杂的税收制度。然而，收益最大化的努力水平和围绕这一最佳水平的激励在不同的处理中是相同的。我们在两种处理方式中引入了相同的附加税顺序。接受复杂治疗的受试者对新税反应不足；一些人完全忽视了新税。与理性注意力不集中模型的预测相反，受试者同样可能忽视或大或小的激励性变化。
How does tax complexity affect people’s reaction to tax changes? To answer this question, we conduct an experiment in which subjects work for a piece rate and face taxes. One treatment features a simple, the other a complex tax system. The payoff-maximizing effort level and the incentives around this optimum are, however, identical across treatments. We introduce the same sequence of additional taxes in both treatments. Subjects in the complex treatment underreact to new taxes; some ignore new taxes entirely. Contrary to predictions from models of rational inattention, subjects are equally likely to ignore large or small incentive changes.