Dilemma game in a cellular automaton model with a non-signalized intersection
Dilemma game in a cellular automaton model with a non-signalized intersection
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具有非信号化交叉点的元胞自动机模型中的困境博弈
DOI：
10.1140/epjb/e2012-20904-x
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发表时间：
2012-02-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Chen, W.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhang, W.;Zhang, W.;Chen, W.
我们在 Nagel-Schreckenberg 模型中对无信号交叉口的交通流、能量耗散和社会收益进行了数值研究。从博弈论的角度，我们分析了在某些交通状态下观察到的困境博弈。有四个交通阶段：自由流阶段、分相 1、分相 2 和 v(max) > 1 情况下的堵塞阶段。在分相 1 中，最大交通流量对应于最小能量耗散。当v(max) > 1 时，在相偏析1 处观察到困境博弈；当v(max) = 1 时，在相偏析状态下观察到困境博弈。理论分析与数值结果一致。
We numerically study traffic flow, energy dissipation and social payoff in the Nagel-Schreckenberg model with a non-signalized intersection. In terms of game theory, we analyze dilemma game observed in some traffic states. There are four traffic phases: free-flow phase, phase-segregated 1, phase-segregated 2 and jammed phase in the case of v(max) > 1. In phase-segregated 1, maximum traffic flow corresponds to minimal energy dissipation. Dilemma game is observed at the phase-segregated 1 in the case of v(max) > 1, and phase segregation state when v(max) = 1. Theoretical analyses give an agreement with numerical results.