A Principal-Agent Model of Bidding Firms in Multi-Unit Auctions
A Principal-Agent Model of Bidding Firms in Multi-Unit Auctions
复制标题
多单位拍卖中投标公司的委托代理模型
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Bichler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Paulsen;M. Bichler
在频谱拍卖等多目标市场中，监事会和公司管理层之间的委托代理关系非常普遍。管理层的目标是赢得价值最高的许可证，而董事会则希望最大化利润并限制风险敞口。如果效率要求多个公司协调赢得较小的对象集，我们证明委托人会这样做，而代理人不会这样做，并将需求膨胀到较大的对象集。我们首先证明了，即使委托人拥有关于估值的完整信息，她通常也不能在第一价格密封投标一揽子拍卖中使代理人仅受预算约束的激励。有了隐藏的信息，委托人需要确定或有转移，这在代理人强烈的价值最大化动机下是不可能的。相反，在上升的一揽子拍卖中，这是直截了当的。上升拍卖的第二价格支付规则使委托人能够克服代理问题，动态机制进一步促进了协调。
Principal-agent relationships between the supervisory board and the management of firms are widespread in multi-object markets such as spectrum auctions. The management aims at winning the highest valued licenses whereas the board wants to maximize profit and limits exposure. If efficiency requires multiple firms to coordinate on winning smaller sets of objects, we demonstrate that principals would do so while agents would not and inflate demand to larger sets. We first show that even if the principal has complete information about the valuations she cannot generally incentive-align the agent with only budgets constraints in first-price sealed-bid package auctions. With hidden information the principal needs to determine contingent transfers, which can be impossible with strong value-maximizing motives of the agent. Contrary, in ascending package auctions this is straightforward. The second-price payment rule of the ascending auction enables the principal to overcome the agency problem and the dynamic mechanism further facilitates coordination.