Response to McMahan’s Paper
Response to McMahan’s Paper
复制标题
对麦克马汉论文的回应
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Micheal Walzer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Micheal Walzer
杰夫·麦克马汉在这篇文章中所要提供的是对战时个人责任的仔细而准确的描述。我认为，他实际上提供的是一个仔细而精确的描述，如果战争是和平时期的活动，战争中的个人责任会是什么样的。我不打算对账目提出异议。其中一些对我的头脑来说有点太精细了;我对无法安抚的追求者的情况没有任何明确的直觉（除了直觉，这在我所知道的世界中不太可能）。但我承认麦克马汉的总体描述是对我们通常，传统上，我甚至可以说传统上，分配道德责任的方式的一种感性描述。我不否认它的洞察力;我只想否认它与战争环境的相关性。毕竟，这是我们憎恨战争的原因之一：它是一种盲目的集体化事业;一种专制的事业;它凌驾于个性之上，它使我们不可能关注每个人的道德地位;它是普遍的压迫。正义战争理论适应于战争的道德现实，这意味着理论中的“正义”可以说生活在阴影之下。麦克马汉反对这种关于战争现实的“传统"观点，因此，他反对，至少在最初，对战争现实的任何调整。他在最后谈到了调整，在我看来，当他这样做的时候，他或多或少地采纳了我对这些问题的看法。最后，我们的分歧可能只是术语上的。但是，让我们看看我们可以使他最初的反对“传统”帐户。检验标准是：他能否将他致力于做出的个性化判断应用于战争的实际情况？假设他对责任的看法是正确的：那么接下来会发生什么呢？他的论文在应用方面有点吝啬--这和许多哲学著作没什么两样。小说中关于无法替代的追求者的叙述比任何现实生活中的例子都要长得多。但在这篇论文中有一个历史上的例子，我将抓住它，我也将提供一个我自己的例子，来处理麦克马汉的空白。麦克马汉在第35页认为，在第一次海湾战争中，伊拉克共和国卫队和正规军之间有一个重要的道德区别。卫队是一支精锐的志愿部队，忠于政权，因此对袭击科威特的责任“比正规军的义务兵更大”。因此，美国领导的联盟“有权对共和国卫队造成与哲学（2006）34：43-45 DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9008-x一样多的伤害
What Jeff McMahan means to provide in this essay is a careful and precise account of individual responsibility in time of war. What he actually provides, I think, is a careful and precise account of what individual responsibility in war would be like if war were a peacetime activity. I am not going to dispute the account. Some of it is a little too fine for my head; I don’t have any clear intuition about the case of the Implacable Pursuer (except for the intuition that it isn’t a likely case in the world that I know). But I recognize McMahan’s overall account as a perceptive description of the way we ordinarily, conventionally, I would even say traditionally, assign moral responsibility. I don’t deny its perceptiveness; I only want to deny its relevance to the circumstances of war. This is, after all, one of the reasons that we hate war: It is a coercively collectivizing enterprise; a tyrannical enterprise; it overrides individuality, and it makes the kind of attention that we would like to pay to each person’s moral standing impossible; it is universally oppressive. Just war theory is adapted to the moral reality of war, which means that ‘‘justice’’ in the theory lives, so to speak, under a cloud. Now, McMahan is against this ‘‘traditional’’ view of war’s reality and therefore he is opposed, at least initially, to any adaptation to it. He comes to adaptation at the end, and when he does, it seems to me, he more or less adopts my own view about these matters. Our disagreement, at the end, may be only terminological. But let’s see what we can make of his initial opposition to the ‘traditional’ account. The test is this: Can he apply the individualizing judgments he is committed to make to the actual circumstances of war? Suppose that he is right about responsibility: What follows? His paper is a bit stingy with applications – not unlike a lot of philosophical work. The fictional narrative about the Implacable Pursuer is developed at much greater length than any real-life example. But there is one historical example in the paper, and I am going to seize on it. I will also provide an example of my own, to deal with McMahan’s lacunae. McMahan argues on page 35 that in the first Gulf War, there was an important moral distinction to be made between the Iraqi Republican Guard and the regular army. The Guard was an elite volunteer unit, loyal to the regime, and so responsible for the attack on Kuwait ‘‘to a higher degree’’ than the conscripts of the regular army. And so the Americanled coalition was “entitled to inflict as much harm on the Republican Guard as was Philosophia (2006) 34:43–45 DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9008-x