Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Complete Characterization
Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Complete Characterization
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作者：
N. Yoshihara;A. Yamada
在劳动技能不平等的生产经济中，计划者在生产前不知道可行分配的集合，本文首先引入了一个新的公理，不相关技能的不可操纵性（NIS），它与Maskin单调性一起构成了Nash实现的充分必要条件。其次，本文定义了自然机制，然后充分表征纳什实现的自然机制，使用一个稍微强大的变化NIS和支持价格独立性。根据这些特征，它表明，有一个Maskin单调分配规则，这是无法实现时，有关个人技能的信息是缺席。与此相反，许多公平分配规则，这是已知的，在目前的文献中是不可实现的，是可实现的自然机制。JEL分类编号：C72，D51，D78，D82
In production economies with unequal labor skills, where the planner is ignorant to the set of feasible allocations in advance of production, the paper firstly introduces a new axiom, Nonmanipulability of Irrelevant Skills (NIS), which together with Maskin Monotonicity constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. Secondly, the paper defines natural mechanisms, and then fully characterizes Nash implementation by natural mechanisms, using a slightly stronger variation of NIS and Supporting Price Independence. Following these characterizations, it is shown that there is a Maskin monotonic allocation rule which is not implementable when information about individual skills is absent. In contrast, many fair allocation rules, which are known to be non-implementable in the present literature, are implementable by the natural mechanisms. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D51, D78, D82