A note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models
A note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.11.002
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
J. Hindriks;Y. Nishimura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Hindriks;Y. Nishimura
本文重新审视肯普夫和Rota-Graziosi（J. Pub. Econ.94：768-776，2010），这表明，在内生时间博弈下，小区域领导是风险占优均衡。他们在一个模型中得出了这一结果，在这个模型中，地区之间的不对称性转化为资本需求的不同梯度，但垂直截距相同。在本文中，我们简单地通过考虑不同的垂直截距但相同的梯度来反转不对称的形式。原因是市场势力通常与需求函数的截距有关，而与斜率无关。然后，我们表明，领导的大区域成为风险主导的均衡，甚至可以成为帕累托上级。
This paper reexamines the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94: 768-776, 2010), which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game. They obtained this result in a model where the asymmetry among regions translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts. In this paper, we simply reverse the form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradients. The reason is that market power is typically related to the intercept and not to the slope of the demand function. We then show that leadership by the large region becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become Pareto superior.