Zero Residual Attacks on Industrial Control Systems and Stateful Countermeasures
Zero Residual Attacks on Industrial Control Systems and Stateful Countermeasures
复制标题
对工业控制系统的零残留攻击和状态对策
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jianying Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. R. Ghaeini;Nils Ole Tippenhauer;Jianying Zhou
在本文中，我们讨论了实际实施的隐形攻击的工业控制系统。我们首先回顾了以前的作品中提出的攻击。然后，我们提供了零残差攻击（ZeRA），它允许攻击者利用状态异常检测器的估计和残差匹配作为实际估计残差的一部分来发起隐形攻击。为了执行零残差攻击，攻击者将需要使用两个状态估计器，每个状态估计器用于物理系统状态和检测器系统状态，这增加了迄今为止尚未讨论的复杂性。我们实施了ZeRA并证明了其有效性。然后，我们建议使用状态检测器（SD）来精确检测这种隐形攻击。我们设计并实现了SD检测器。性能评估结果表明，我们可以检测到隐形攻击，如ZeRA，精度在99%以上，灵敏度在99%以上，马修斯相关系数在0.98以上。
In this paper, we discuss the practical implementation of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. We start by reviewing the attacks proposed in prior works. Then, we offer Zero-Residual Attacks (ZeRA), which allow the attacker to launch stealthy attacks leveraging estimation of the stateful anomaly detector and matching of residuals as a fraction of actual estimation residual. To perform the zero residual attack, the attacker will require the use of two state estimators each for the physical system state and the detector system state, adding complexity that was so far not discussed. We implement ZeRA and demonstrate its efficacy. Then, we propose to use a Stateful Detector (SD) to precisely detect such stealthy attacks. We design and implement the SD detector. The obtained results from the performance evaluation demonstrate that we can detect stealthy attacks such as the ZeRA, with precision above 99%, sensitivity above 99%, and Matthews correlation coefficient above 0.98.