Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
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与厌恶不确定性的投标人进行密封投标拍卖
DOI：
10.1007/s001990050209
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
K. Lo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Lo
传统的拍卖分析假设，每个竞标者对对手估值的信念是由一个概率度量来表示的。受Ellsberg悖论等实验结果的启发，本文考察了在具有独立私人价值的第一和第二价格密封投标拍卖中放松这一假设的后果。Gilboa和Schmeidler的多先验模型[Journal of Digital Economics，18(1989)，141-153]被专门用来表示投标人(和拍卖人)的偏好。推导了第一次价格拍卖的唯一均衡竞价策略。此外，在模型的一个有趣的参数专门化下，证明了第一价格拍卖的帕累托支配第二价格拍卖。
Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics,18(1989), 141–153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model, it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.