FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00356.x
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发表时间：
2012-04-01
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Muto, Shigeo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kishimoto, Shin;Muto, Shigeo
在本文中，我们考虑一个古诺双寡头市场，在这个市场中，专利持有者与其竞争对手就降低成本的创新的许可支付进行谈判。应用纳什议价解决方案，我们比较了两种许可政策，固定费用和特许权使用费。我们的结果如下。对于两家公司来说，如果创新不是很激烈的话，版税许可比固定费用许可要好。所以，版税许可总是要执行的。此外，虽然存在消费者偏好固定费用许可的情况，但从社会角度来看，特许权使用费许可总是优于固定费用许可。
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost-reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.