A Study of the Electoral Business Cycle in Japan: Elections and Government Spending on Public Construction
A Study of the Electoral Business Cycle in Japan: Elections and Government Spending on Public Construction
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日本选举经济周期研究：选举和政府公共建设支出
DOI：
10.2307/422311
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发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Yoshitaka Nishizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Kohno;Yoshitaka Nishizawa
近年来，关于选举商业周期的文献试图探讨现代资本主义民主国家中国家选举的时机与经济状况之间的关系。对这一问题进行了各种理论和实证研究。他们有一个共同的主题。为了赢得选举，现任政府将操纵经济以吸引最多的选票。由于这种操纵，某些经济指标随着时间的推移而波动，因此系列中的峰值与选举时间同步。本文研究了日本选举商业周期的性质，并试图确定自民党政府试图为选举目的操纵经济的企图。早期的研究，如猪口和塔夫特的研究，认为日本存在选举商业周期，但他们没有具体说明什么政治工具可以用来操纵短期经济福祉。2猪口特别声称，日本的明显周期与其说是由政治操纵经济造成的，不如说是由调整选举时间以适应经济高峰造成的。我们将挑战猪口的评估，（1）通过展示自民党政府并不总是能够控制选举的时间，（2）通过提供证据表明它利用了政府的公共建设支出用于选举目的。
The recent literature on the electoral business cycle has tried to explore the relationship between the timing of national elections and economic conditions in modem capitalist democracies. A variety of studies, both theoretical and empirical, have been conducted on the subject. They share a common theme. In an attempt to win elections the incumbent government will manipulate the economy in order to attract the most votes. As a result of this manipulation, certain economic indicators fluctuate over time so that the peaks in the series synchronize with the timing of elections.' This paper examines the nature of the electoral business cycle in Japan and seeks to identify the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government's attempt to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes. Earlier studies, such as those by Inoguchi and Tufte, suggest that an electoral business cycle exists in Japan, but they do not specify what political instruments are available for manipulating short-term economic well-being.2 Inoguchi, in particular, claims that the apparent cycle in Japan is caused not so much by political manipulation of the economy, but rather by adjusting the timing of elections to the peaks of the economy. We will challenge Inoguchi's assessment, (1) by showing that the LDP government has not always been capable of controlling the timing of elections and (2) by presenting evidence to indicate that it has taken advantage of government spending on public construction for electoral purposes.