Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules
Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules
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立法机关的讨价还价：开放式与封闭式修正案规则的实验研究
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Steven F. Lehrer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Guillaume Fréchette;J. Kagel;Steven F. Lehrer
我们在立法讨价还价的分配模型框架内研究了公开和封闭修正案规则的差异效应。数据表明，在开放修正规则下，利益分配的延迟时间更长，利益分配更加平等，在这两种规则下，提出者获得的利益份额都比联盟成员更大，在封闭修正规则下，博弈收敛于最小获胜联盟。然而，作为实验基础的理论模型(Baron和Ferejohn 1989)和数据之间存在重要的数量差异，因为在封闭规则下最小获胜联盟的频率要高得多(理论预测在两个规则下对于我们的参数值都是最小获胜联盟)，并且联盟成员之间的利益分配比预测的要平等得多。后者与经济学中的缩小馅饼双边讨价还价博弈实验的结果是一致的，我们将我们的结果与之联系起来。感谢来自NSF和匹兹堡大学经济学部和DRMS部门的研究支持。我们受益于大卫·库珀、马西莫·莫雷利、杰克·奥克斯，以及卡内基梅隆大学、高等商业学院、哈佛大学、印第安纳大学、ITAM、蒙特利尔大学、魁北克大学、蒙太尔大学、匹兹堡大学、约瑟夫·L·罗特曼学院、多伦多大学、俄亥俄州立大学、德克萨斯州宽帽{{
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大学、蒂尔堡大学中心、西密歇根大学、沃顿商学院、宾夕法尼亚大学、2000年公共选择会议、2000年行为经济学夏季研究所、2000年计量经济学世界大会和CEA第35届年会。我们对所有剩余的错误负责。
We investigate the differential effects of open versus closed amendment rules within the framework of a distributive model of legislative bargaining. The data show that there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the open amendment rule, the proposer gets a larger share of the benefits than coalition members under both rules, and play converges toward minimal winning coalitions under the closed amendment rule. However, there are important quantitative differences between the theoretical model underlying the experiment (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) and data, as the frequency of minimal winning coalitions is much greater under the closed rule (the theory predicts minimal winning coalitions under both rules for our parameter values) and the distribution of benefits between coalition members is much more egalitarian than predicted. The latter are consistent with findings from shrinking pie bilateral bargaining game experiments in economics, to which we relate our results.Research support from the Economics Division and the DRMS Divisions of NSF and the University of Pittsburgh is gratefully acknowledged. We have benefited from comments by David Cooper, Massimo Morelli, Jack Ochs, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Harvard University, Indiana University, ITAM, Université de Montreal, Universite du Québec a Montréal, University of Pittsburgh, Joseph L. Rotman School, University of Toronto, Ohio State University, Texas widehat{{
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m M}} University, Tilburg University CENTER, Western Michigan University, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, the 2000 Public Choice Meetings, the 2000 Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics, the 2000 Econometric Society World Congress meetings, and the CEA 35th Annual Meetings. We are responsible for all remaining errors.