Judge: Don't Vote!
Judge: Don't Vote!
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DOI：
10.1287/opre.2014.1269
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发表时间：
2014-05-01
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Laraki, Rida
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Balinski, Michel;Laraki, Rida
This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing-majority judgment-that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.
