Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the
Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the
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发表时间：
2010
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通讯作者：
Dispersive Order;René Kirkegaard
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作者：
Dispersive Order;René Kirkegaard
Maskin 和 Riley (2000) 对两个异质投标人的第一价格和第二价格拍卖中的收入排名进行了重新审查。目标是统一并扩展他们研究的两个模型，其中……第一价格拍卖更有利……。有人认为，他们的命题应该被视为更一般定理的推论。通过使用机制设计技术，问题得到了简化，排名的直觉也得到了发展。粗略地说，当强投标人的分配比弱投标人的分配更分散且更分散时，......第一价格拍卖更有利可图。这一充分条件类似于垄断定价中的标准假设，即需求低的市场对价格更敏感。最后，机制设计方法允许将收入排名扩展到具有更多投标人的某些设置。只要只有一个强有力的投标人，或者更一般地说，如果投标人之间的不对称性“足够大”，那么第一价格拍卖就更有利可图。
Maskin and Riley’s (2000) seminal ranking of revenue in the …rst-price and second-price auction with two heterogeneous bidders is reexamined. The objective is to unify and extend the two models they study in which the …rstprice auction is more pro…table. It is argued that their propositions should be viewed as corollaries of a more general theorem. By using mechanism design techniques, the problem is simpli…ed and intuition for the ranking is developed. Roughly speaking, the …rst-price auction is more pro…table when the strong bidder’s distribution is ‡atter and more disperse than the weak bidder’s distribution. This su¢ cient condition is analogous to the standard assumption in monopoly pricing that markets with low demand is more price sensitive. Finally, the mechanism design approach allows the revenue ranking to be extended to certain settings with more bidders. The …rst-price auction is more pro…table as long as there is only one strong bidder, or, more generally, if the asymmetry between bidders is “large enough”.